1 50 2 https://www.arxiupmaragall.catalunyaeuropa.net/files/original/8/639/PartisanReview_1975_NotesonSpain_PM.pdf bbd0510863d4c3720414720b71406959 PDF Text Text Partisan Review, vXLII, n3, 1975 NOTES ON SPAlN P A S C U A 1 M A f { A ( ; A L L 1 R U B E R T de VENTOS 445 Oiily I I I J W I1ic.y t .ilk about change and democracy instead of merely anri-(.oiiiiit~i~ii~tt~ '1 Iicir new language should not be taken as an expression ofpoliiii .il I:oi~<lwill17;irfrom it. These changes have becn forced upon them by cvcsrii\, 11rc.y .itc, 111 effect, changes produced in an effort to contain ~h'tnl:c, :II)II I I I C I)if:gcst mistake of al1 would be to forget that the armed forc<.\' I),lr h i i i y l l ' i q always been the regime's sureit weapon. Pascual Maragall and Xavier Rubert de Ventos 'l'wo iliirigs happened to give at least the idea of politics in Spain a EDITORS' NOTE: "Notes on Spain" is excerptedfrom a longer account o f the political situation in Spain, sent to us in Januay, 197s. The postscript was received in May . It is hard to imagine how much Spain has changed in the last four or five years and at the same time how much things are still the same. The country has modernized. Highways (and tolls); thousands of brand-new little cars roaring everywhere; high-rise buildings; pop music; a middle class with a new game, investing in bonds and equities, and a new slang, stock-exchange jargon; a neat Europeanization of fashions (in fact of course, an Americanization, but without the lack of style that makes American fashions fascinating) ; higher wages-in a word, the thing that is called economic development, or at least economic growth. At the same time, Spain is still a backward country. Everything is undersize, insufficient, middle-of-the-road, unoriginal. Everything lacks color in colorful Spain. Highways are congested as quickly as they are built. People are discontented with their lives. The cost of living, up 15-20 percent each year, eats up higher earnings. Even land speculation, the most prosperous industry in a country that is urbanizing at an incredible pace, has become risky as young radical planners have been called in to bring order to Spain's messy cities. Politics have changed a bit. (Some would say a lot.) One can talk democracy and freedom and political parties to a degree that was unimaginable a few years ago (when people only thought and whispered about revolution). Yet the last word is (perhaps "was" when this piece gets to the reader) still that ofFranco's supporters. The last word is, in fact, on the lips of a man who literally cannot speak: Franco is too old. The point is, the regime is the same, and the same people speak for it. rncarritig. 0 1 i Deccmber 20, 1973, Admira1 Carrero Blanco, the linchpin of Franco's cffforts to ensure that his regime survives him, was blown up by Bascl~iciiatioilalists. On April 25, 1974, the fascist post-Salazar regime in Portiigal was overthrown by the military, backed by illcgal left-wing parties. The post-Carrero government, with Premier Arias Navarro at its head, had bcen trying to get across the following message: "Wc are fascists, you see, but wc have chosen democracy-some sort of democratic clothing-to survive. ' ' On the one hand, on February 12, Arias publicly promised evolution toward a more democratic state; on the other, on March 2 , Salvador Puig Antich, a Catalan anarchist who had killed a secret policeman in a Barcelona shoot-out,was executed, traditionally, by garotte, following :1 vcry traditiorial political trial. The balancing act could have worked. But the Portug~icscrevolution suddenly altered the meaning of the February promises. The press, in only slightly veiled terms, urged the Chief of the High Military Staff to imitate Spinola. The key-words "apertura" (opening, evolution) and "espíritu del 12 de Febrero' ' (the date ofArias Navarro's first speech) seemed to be enough to cover al1 kinds of democratic manifestos in the newspapers. The new Minister of Information, Pio Cabanillas, allowed it to go on. Man y ricw, and newly outspoken, magazines appeared. In Spain "the future" mearis-unless otherwise stated-tlic period following the dictator's death. In July 1974, Franco was hospitalizcd for the first time since the Civil War. Then came Greece. From Cyprus uniil the anti-monarchial referendum in December, the fa11 of the Greek Junta was used as a weapon by evolutionists inside the system. In effcct, tlle Portuguesc-(iscek alternative was a paradigm of "how things ought to go and ought not 1.0 go." Greece was the insider's illustration of the "correct" way of fascism; Portugal, rllc cxamplc for the illegal opposition. Prepar;irioris for tlic furiire liad become, for Spain, open during Franco's illness, and they coiiiiiiiic(l t o be evcn after the throwback following the explosion of a boirib ii(.:ii- t l i ( . Iieiid(.l~iartersof the national police in Madrid. �P A S C U A L M A R A G A L L 1 R U B E R T de V E N T O S Some intellectuals were arrested, supposedly for having helped Basque nationalists in the bombing, for it had served perfectly to create an atmosphere of anxiety within the government. The Minister of Information was fired ; the liberal Minister of Finance resigned in sympathy , and a number of voluntary resignations and dismissals followed. Arias himself was said to be on the verge of quitting. The real decision making, of course, is done in the corridors of El Pardo, Franco's official residence, and at the private dinner parties of rival or allied figures. After some lobbying, Arias worked out a compromise. He would stay if his proposed Law of Political Associations was passed before the end of the year. The bill was presented on television by an apparently disappointed Arias, who pleaded for patience and understanding. Under the bill, associations must be passed on by the Consejo Nacional de Movimiento-the remains of the old Fascist party, now a sort of consultative body. The mere possibility of a public quarrel among Franco's heirs about who is going to get what scares the ultra-rightists. It looks, however, very much like the last scene in this period of Spanish political life. Who would be elected if free elections were held tomorrow in Spain? Nobody knows for sure. This is what worries the moderate right, as well as its foreign friends, starting with the United States. Only the conservatives and the far right are likely to be able to pul1 together ; forming associations also serves their needs. What is important here is that the resources that the Francoists are accustomed to draw upon are at odds with those needed for the future, and they know it-from Girón, the old hard-line Falangist leader whose words today are reminiscent of a certain period of Peronism, to Fraga Iribarna, the ex-Minister of Information who presents himself as a man of the center ready to make a coalition with the "left" (that is Christian and Social Democrats), to those long-time monopolists of government posts called the Opus Dei. They ruled for many years beneath Franco's shadow, allowing him to make and unmake strange combinations and trade-offs among them, as long as this was the safest way for the Spanish oligarchy and bureaucracy, which they al1 represent, to go on clipping the coupons of economic development. The secret of Franco's so-called unique ski11 in arbitrating conflicts is that he was and is the resultant vector of their forces, rather than an externa1 ruler imposed by the military on the wealthy. The success of tliese classes in retaining power had depended, in great measure, on their capacity for self-effacement whenever necessary. Now this is 447 no longer a viable way of creating governments that represent a balance of their interests. They feel the need for public debate and traditional parliamentary practices. They need to know "who is who" in a society that they rule but don't quite know. They need a different and more rigorous selection process for their political representatives in the transition period ahead . But even if nobody knows who would win a national election, many of the people on the top sense that they would be wiped out if such a free contest were held. Now, no ruling class in its right mind is likely to organize such an election. It is more likely to crumble before such an event occurs. This is why their provisional unanimity is now based on the catch-word "Hurry up!" Upon this complicated mixture of self-deception and truth, a tacit pact is probably in the making between the regime's more liberal and intelligent figures and the more hard pressed among the illegal opposition, at the expense both of regime hard liners and the radical oppositionists, who urge ruptura" rather than "apertura. " " Last November 14, not long before public discussion in the Consejo Nacional of Arias's bill on political associations, there was a meeting in Madrid of various democratic and evolutionist leaders. The leaders were absent when the police arrived; they hurried to Dirección General de Seguridad and tried to be arrested-without success. Prime Minister Arias then managed to leak to the press his ignorance of the raid. Those who were arrested represented al1 the forces said to be in contact with the Prime Minister before October : Catalan democrats and social democrats, Spanish socialists like Felipe Gonzalez, and social democrats like Dionisio Ridruejo, an ex-Falangist leader who was welcomed as a traitor in the political police headquarters, the son of General Diaz Alegria, the chief of staff urged last February to emulate Spinola, and others. These are the people waiting just behind the door. They won't enter the association game, but they won't openly boycott it either if they are assured that the bill is only a beginning. Their chances would be good in an election. They have money, political experience, and access to the media, in varying degrees. Above al1 they are outsiders, not insiders. But they have no grass roots organization, with the exception of the P.S.O.E., the Spanish Socialist Party. Still, it is only a baby compared to the Communist Party ; its strength no more than that of an infant compared to the total force of the revolutionary groups to the C.P.'s left. And here lies the problem. If the evolution gets "out of hand," these �P A S C U A L M A R A G A L L 1 R U B E R T de V E N T O S moderate groups probably wouldn't be able to guarantee an orderly return to democratic "normality" without the help of the C:P. But the Communists can't by definition be made part of any plan acceptable to the evolutionists, because if they were, the far right, the bureaucrats, and the military would not be alone in asking : "Why the he11 did we fight the war?" Most of the Spanish bourgeoisie would raise the question. 449 he is also said to have told Nicolás Franco that the only thing the Communists expect from Juan Carlos is that he'll quit.) To theleft ofthe C.P. are the Maoists and Trotskyists. Since '68, they've been strong in the universities and even high schools, and among the illegal teachers' unions ; they also have a constituency among the working class, in the factory and the neighborhood. But on the whole, after a period of anti-liberal "leftism, the Maoist and Trotskyist groups joined democratic coalitions with the C.P., the socialists, and Christian Democrats. A case in point is the Assembly of Catalonia, a huge illegal body embracing al1 the parties and also Catalan autonomists. Perhaps the broadest based of the political groups in the country, it's been around for years, meets and is trailed by the political police every once in a while. ~ r o mthe ~ S s e m bcould l ~ come a provisional governrnent for Catalonia. But the C.P. and its right-wing allies in the Junta Democrática might bypass the Catalan Assembly in order to make a quick deal. Evolutionists, particularly if theylrearmy men, or have held government jobs, are likely to be uncomfortable with the prospect of a truly popular state. As the Democratic Junta's manifesto proclaimed : "The non-continuity of the Regime is required for the continuity of the state." " The Communist Party plays a central role in the whole affair. Its force has been patiently amassed through a thousand fights and lately also through clever bargaining with the monarchists, such as Areilza and Calvo Serer (both followers of Don Juan, not Juan Carlos), Catalan industrialists and bankers such as Durán Farrell, Trias Fargas, and Jordi Pujol, and al1 the middle-class democratic groups outside the law. Democratic leaders, evolutionist insiders, liberal generals like Diaz Alegria, and Nicolás Franco himself, a nephew of the dictator and a prominent figure in Prince Juan Carlos' staff-al1 are secretly, and anxiously, getting in touch with the Communists. The party itself isn't denying the contacts are being made. It openly advocates a "pact for freedom" in exchange for legal recognition and minimal liberties. It was a prime mover in the coalition of monarchists and businessmen, called the Junta Democrática, that formed in Paris during Franco's illness in July '74. Itis not hard to see how, even though the word "Communist" is taboo to the people on top, many of the political men representing similar interests feel impelled to deal directly with the C.P. Five thousandmembersstrong (according toacautious 1972 State Department estimate), the Spanish C.P. is a well-oiled machine that publishes five papers and magazines, has infiltrated theofficial unions at the factory and even . at the city or provincial level. It could easily quiet the more radical groups that squabble al1 over the country by imposing on them the hypothetical terms of a hypothetical agreement with evolutionists and mild democrats. The party's main target now is the army (the Portuguese alliance serves them well as an example). For unless the armed forces are, at the least, passive about the possibility of the C.P. holding positions of power, there's no clear way in for them. They probably wouldn't use the old slogan of a national or general strike (it's more and more the property of the extreme left, anyway), except as a tactical show of force to clear the way for compromise. The C.P. is playing a waiting game. Since Carrero was killed, it has cooled off mass movements ; and Santiago Carrillo, the party's general secretary has said that the Communists would accept a monarchy freely chosen by the people. (But Evolutionists are also not likely to recognize that the question of national minorities is a live onp, for one of the principies that has unified the upper class and the bourgeois elite around Franco is his insistence on "the unity of direct reference both to the necessity that Spain's lands and peop1es"-a those classes (including the Basque and Catalan industrialists and bankers) felt for a unified, protected national market, and to the centralist feelings of the Castilian rural and urban middle-class from which come many state and army officials. To the extent that the Civil War of 1936-39 protected the interests of capital in general, much of the northern business world in Catalonia and Euzkadi supported Franco at the price of their national pride and their interest in free enterprise. Today, however, the northern middle class is no longer willing to swallow Castilian centralism, and the northern rich see that the Francoist Regime is not able to get them into the Common Market. Understanding that the slogan of Spain's unity appears to them a mere cover for continuing an inept, dictatorial Regime that is unable to cope with domestic diversity and foreign challenge makes it easier to understand the Catalan Assembly, and, more important, the wide support for the nationalist movement ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, or "Basque Country and free- �P A S C U A L M A R A G A L L 1 R U B E R T de V E N T O S dom' '). When an ETA commando "executed" Carrero Blanco, the initials of this organization became magic words for most people. "ETA had dared. " A long history of fear and hate began to be rationalized. The "quiet maturity of the Spanish people," which the Regime heralded at that moment, was only the passivity brought by momentary shock. It belies the officials' own certainty that someday everything is going to change overnight after a sign is written on the wall. They simply couldn't believe that Carrero had been blown over a church wall and their own heads were still on their shoulders. Arias, after all, in 1939 was the 'LJackal of Malaga." Mayalde, vice president of the puppet Parliament, was the man who travelled to Nazi-occupied France to get the President of the Republican autonomous Government of Catalonia, Lluis Companys, and bring him to Barcelona to have him executed. And so on. Salvador Puig Antich's execution is only one of the most recent on a long list. It took place after those at the top were unable even to explain who the executors of Carrero Blanco were, and it was meant to make clear that it was they who had decided "to go democratic." Their names, the execution was meant to signify, were not on the wall. Yet democratization is simply too late. It could have worked in 1945. It could also have worked in 1957-59, when the Opus Dei, speaking a technoctatic, Europeanized language, began to give the cabinet a "new look." It could even have worked a couple of years ago, when the crisis of the West did not seem as plain as it does today, when Caetano and Papadopoulos were still in power and post-Gaullism reigned in France. Not today. This is what the ousted Opus Dei and the collaborationist Christian Democrats whisper in Franco'sear. Today an "opening" means a "break," and the only way to stop ETA is to give in to democratic pressures more than is safe for the regime. And in fact, there are few chances of "opening" without "breaking" the regime. But there is also no clear way of reassuring the executioners, tracked and trapped by ETA commandos, denounced by a freer press and despised by everybody . That is, there is no way to continue to balance political punishment with a show of democratization that does not include opening wide enough to bring in the moderates for such a policy mix. In sum, the political equations have no straightforward solution so long as the figures in the regime remain tied to an evermore burdensome and decrepit Franco. I t has yet to be seen whom the military will support. An attempt on the part of the more fascist generals to block any democratization could tip the balance in favor of the Dernocratic Junta among the more liberal military men. Confrontations have already taken place between the army's political extremes. Middle-of-the-road military men, it is assumed, will back Juan 451 Carlos, even though thc Prince is not their political dream. This again is the Democratic Junta's biggest problem. Juan Carlos could count on this diffuse rnilitary support to win short-term recognition by the democratic forces if he enacts a program of change not too different from that advanced by the Junta's Manifesto. This is why 1975 could be the year of the hasty coronation of Juan Carlos. and then of his overthrow. What about the intellectuals? Theirs is a long story. From the end of the war through the fifties, those still alive in Spain collaborated culturally, hoping to give some kind of formal expression to the fascist "idearium." Finally, the last of them defected-the Falangists to Marxism, the Catholics to amore liberal Catholicism. And in fact, liberal Catholicism became for a while the only way to express the longing for social and cultural change. Since the mid-sixties the Spanish intelligentsia has been responding to the same currents as have Western intellectuals. The new influences made themselves felt in milder and second-hand forms pethaps, but they contrasted more sharply with a flat and insipid past. The crisis of the myth of unlimited growth ; the collapse of welfare statism ; the sense of a cultural limbo which despite repression had come over the Pyrennees to Madrid and Barcelona along with the Spanish economic miracle; since 1968, disillusion with e revolution ‘ now" ; since 1971, disillusion with the "cultural revo1ution"al1 have meant that the intellectuals' political and social concerns have turned back to classic political and nationalist issues (whether Basque or Catalan). In the early sixties, the Spanish intellectuals had incarcerated themselves in the clandestine political parties. But now, their sensitivity to what they see as imperial patronization-of the Social Democrats by the Americans; of the Communists by the Soviet Union; of the Christian Democrats by the Vatican-has meant many of them have joined socialist reconstruction platforms. It remains to be seen how they will steer their way through two clear dangers: The Scylla of leftists' intellectualism, the creation of a party of and for the intellectuals2. la the P.S.U. ; and the Charybdis of pure electoralism. The Spanish oligarchy, it has been argued, needs America as much as Arnerica seems to need Spain. The United States' military presence, the argument goes, can be used as a symbol to discourage domestic upheaval. And Franco's Spain, it's true, has been useful to the United States, as an �P A S C U A L M A R A G A L L l R U B E R T d e VENTOS investment as well as a defense base. But it is possible, after al], that the American interest, as interpreted by Mr. Kissinger, will see itself better served by Arias than by Carrero and his technocrats in the Opus Dei, ousted after his death. The essential question, after all, is stability, in the European defense alliance as well as in Spain. The Opus Dei was instrumental in Juan Carlos's nomination as Franco's successot but, as the confusion of last summer clearly shows, was unable to manage a transition. Portugal has meant another change in the balance of power in the Mediterranean requiring, in the State Department's view, a more flexible Spanish Government than the CarreroOpus Dei combine, reminiscent of Gaullist pride and blindness. Perhaps for ideological as well as strategic reasons, Kissinger has implied that the European Social Democrats should be both more concrete and more flexible in whar they ask of Spanish officials. He would, apparently, like to see a strong, Western-oriented Social Democratic force loosen the C.P. 'S grip on the popular opposition movement. Until a few months ago, the Spanish Communists, like the Italians to whom they are closely linked, were not on very good terms with the Soviet Union. Ironically, chis fact probably militated against the American interest, since America is not essentially anti-Soviet, but rather, anti-socialist and anti-Communist. As capitalists begin to think of the Soviets less as the Fathers of Socialism and more as trading partners, rhe best guarantee of a ''good boy' ' C.P. in Spain, or in any European country, is a Soviet-oriented C.P., respectful of Soviet-American agreements. Hence, perhaps, the surprising reconciliation of the U. S. S.R. and the Spanish C.P. last fall. The new friendship will increase the party's credibility to the right. Spain, it's been said, might tip the balance of Europe to socialism. Such prophesies add little to a correct understanding of events. But the American left should be awake to the need for blocking the tendency of America to prevent further advances toward socialism. P.S. The latest international developments seem to validate what we've said above. Efforts (including American) to get Franco to retire in favor of Juan Carlos, on the basis of a limited "democratic" pact embracing the moderate left and excluding Communists and ETA independentists, continue. President Ford's visit to Madrid should be understood against this background. Divisions within the military led some of them (like Comandante Bosquests and Capitán Julbe) to approach democratic oppositionists (and be arrested); they only accelerated maneuvers in the circles and around the regime. 453 The danger of isolation is leading the purists in the C.P. to forget their divisions over the question of the "opportunism" of the Junta Democrática. Meanwhile, the emergente of broad socialist groupsoutsideof the C.P. and the Junta indicates how determined more and more people are to fight an easy transition towards an adulterated franquism without Franco. Above all, ETA's figl-it against the para-military and political police illustrates the sharpness of the contradictions the regime has been breeding for 35 vears. It cannot evolve short of a radical democratic rupture. WORLD MlLlTARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1974 Ruth Leger Sivard -, A study of contrasting rnilitary and social priorities, with comparative data for 132 countries. $2 post paid WMSE Publ ications, Box 1003, Leesburg, Virginia, 22075 L Her most e x t e n s i v e c o l l e c t i o n of new $7.50 poems . Dufour E d i t i o n s , I n c . C b e s t e r S p r i n g s , Pa. 19425 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 02. Activitat professional Type The nature or genre of the resource Sèrie Description An account of the resource Documentació emanada de l'exercici professional de Pasqual Maragall. - Gabinet Tècnic de Programació de l'Ajuntament de Barcelona (febrer 1965-1968, funcionari 1968-1979) : com a economista. - Servei d'estudis del Banc Urquijo (1965-1968). - Aula Barcelona (setembre 1997 - març 1999): funda i presideix Aula Barcelona com a centre de gestió del coneixement per a l'administració de les ciutats. És un espai comú de reflexió entre universitat, empresa i administració en relació amb la ciutat i el seu passat, present i futur. No tenen tipus Tipo temporal para mapear las fichas sin tipo a la base resource template de Omeka S Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 1550 Title A name given to the resource Notes on Spain Description An account of the resource v. XLII, n3, p. 444-453 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Partisan Review Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Rubert de Ventós, Xavier Maragall, Pasqual, 1941- Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Textual Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Subject The topic of the resource Economia Espanya Language A language of the resource Anglès Type The nature or genre of the resource Article Abstract A summary of the resource. Article publicat al volum XLII número 3 de 1975 de la revista Partisan Review. EAD Archive The Encoded Archival Description is a common standard used to describe collections of small pieces and to create hierarchical and structured finding aids. Level The hierarchical level of the materials being described by the element (may be other level too). Document Articles Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 05.01. Programa Llegat Pasqual Maragall Type The nature or genre of the resource Subsèrie Description An account of the resource Documents sorgits de les activitats de difusió i recerca del programa de la Fundació Catalunya Europa, Llegat Pasqual Maragall. Imatge en moviment A series of visual representations imparting an impression of motion when shown in succession. Examples include animations, movies, television programs, videos, zoetropes, or visual output from a simulation. Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 25:43 min Producer Name (or names) of the person who produced the video Benecé Produccions Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Testimoni Llegat Pasqual Maragall: Xavier Rubert de Ventós Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Muñoz, Josep M. Rubert de Ventós, Xavier Type The nature or genre of the resource Entrevista Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Audiovisual Language A language of the resource Català Subject The topic of the resource Maragall Mira, Pasqual, 1941- Biografia Família Amistat Universitats Filosofia Front Obrer de Catalunya (FOC) Alcaldes Cultura Catalanisme Federalisme Rubert de Ventós, Xavier, 1939-2023 Description An account of the resource Entrevista a Xavier Rubert de Ventós (Barcelona, 1939), filòsof, escriptor i polític català. És catedràtic d’Estètica de la Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, i professor a universitats catalanes i diverses universitats nord-americanes com la Universitat de Harvard, Brown, Berkeley, Cincinnati o New York. A la Universitat de New York va fundar la Càtedra Barcelona-New York i el New York Institute for the Humanities. I amb Eugenio Trías Sagnier van crear el Col·legi de Filosofia (1976), grup que va renovar la filosofia catalana durant la transició democràtica espanyola. Ha estat també parlamentari del Congrés Espanyol i del Parlament Europeu pel PSC-PSOE. Va participar de la lluita antifranquista des del Front Obrer de Catalunya. Amic des de la infància de Pasqual Maragall. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <iframe width="640" height="360" src="https://player.vimeo.com/video/133961647" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; fullscreen" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe> <p><a href="https://vimeo.com/133961647">Testimoni Llegat Pasqual Maragall - Xavier Rubert de Ventós (entrevista sencera)</a> de <a href="https://vimeo.com/llegatpasqualmaragall">FCE - Llegat Pasqual Maragall</a> a <a href="https://vimeo.com">Vimeo</a>.</p> Spatial Coverage Spatial characteristics of the resource. Sala de Juntes de la Facultat de Matemàtiques de la UB Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <span>Entrevista a Xavier Rubert de Ventós del&nbsp;</span><a href="https://www.catalunyaeuropa.net/ca/pasqual-maragall/testimonis/ca/articles_pm/27/">Programa Llegat Pasqual Maragall</a><span>&nbsp;està subjecta a una llicència de&nbsp;</span><a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">Reconeixement-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional de Creative Commons</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2014-11-27 EAD Archive The Encoded Archival Description is a common standard used to describe collections of small pieces and to create hierarchical and structured finding aids. Level The hierarchical level of the materials being described by the element (may be other level too). Document Entrevistes Testimonis Pasqual Maragall